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Immigrants willing to work for low wages
come to Spain seeking economic opportunity.
In turn, they play a large part in Spain’s econ-
omy, affecting the labor market in several ways.
First, immigrants support the aging Spanish
population by contributing to social security,
the Seguridad Social. This is crucial support for
the increasingly strained pension system.
Second, immigrants support Spain’s transition
to a service-based, high-tech economy by work-
ing in low-paying, low-growth industries.
Through their flexibility and mobility, immi-
grants fill gaps in the labor market. Third,
immigrants have the potential to raise the aver-
age Spanish income and strengthen the
Spanish economy overall by increasing eco-
nomic efficiency and productivity. 
Immigration is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon for Spain, as it is for Portugal, Italy,
and Greece. Until the 1970s, Spaniards were
leaving Spain to seek economic opportunities
elsewhere. After that time the trend reversed,
as Spaniards became less likely to emigrate and
foreigners began to arrive in increasing num-
bers. In 1975 there were 165,000 legal foreign
residents in Spain. In 1992 that number near-
ly tripled to 415,000, plus an estimated 70,000
to 294,000 more undocumented foreigners.
(Ugalde, p. 87) In 2004 there were 1.5 million
foreign residents, comprising 3.6 percent of the
Spanish population. (Collado, p. 335) 
This article focuses on the impact of eco-
nomic migrants to Spain from developing
countries in Latin America and Africa. These
people generally come from poor countries and
work for low wages. Latin Americans comprise
39 percent of immigrants to Spain, and Africans
comprise 20 percent. Many other immigrants
to Spain, about 35 percent, come from other
EU countries and Eastern Europe. (“The
Second Transition…”) Political immigrants, or
refugees, comprise a smaller group entering
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Spain. The article first presents an overview of
changes in Spain’s population and compares
Spain’s declining population with the booming
populations of the countries that are the major
sources of Spanish immigration. It then dis-
cusses one major influence on immigrants’
choices to come to Spain — the opportunity to
improve their standard of living. The next sec-
tions explore the economic effects that immi-
grants have in Spain, and how immigration law
in Spain has evolved the way it has. 
Spain’s Population in Decline
Spain’s native population is declining.
After Italy, Spain has the lowest population
growth rate in the EU. Studies indicate that
even with high rates of immigration, Europe’s
population will fall by 6 percent over the next
50 years. By way of contrast, the global popula-
tion is expected to grow by 50 percent.
“Demographers expect the group of working-
age Spaniards to start shrinking around 2010,”
notes The Economist, “after which the demand
for labour can be met only by immigration.”
(“The Second Transition…”) Population growth
and decline affect the rate of economic growth.
Using current demographic trends as a guide,
the European Union’s GDP will be growing at
just over 1 percent per year in 2010, compared
with 2 percent growth in North America and
2.5 percent growth in China. (“Europe’s
Population Implosion”)
If current demographic trends continue in
Spain and in Italy, there will be one pensioner
for every worker. (“Europe’s Population
Implosion”) Joseph Blair describes in this 
volume how the costs associated with support-
ing the elderly are leaving Spain — and its
elderly — vulnerable. Blair shows that at
1995–2000 rates of immigration and fertility,
the percentage of the population over age 60
will jump from 22 percent in 2000 to 45.5 
percent in 2040. (Blair)
Large flows of immigrants will not reverse
the problems associated with Spain’s aging pop-
ulation but will mitigate them. Productive,
hard-working immigrants in this generation
will also age and eventually need the support of
social security later in their lives. Through their
labor, immigrants support the Seguridad Social,
the national health insurance. Today, over 
2 percent of GDP goes into the Seguridad
Social. If one includes other forms of social pro-
tection, Spanish spending on health and wel-
fare over the past 25 years ranges from 16 per-
cent of GDP in 1980 to 21 percent in 1995,
adding up to a substantial amount of govern-
ment spending. (Jimeno, p. 125) 
Immigrants from poor countries in Africa
and South America, the main places of origin
of immigrants to Spain, have higher birth rates
than Spaniards and immigrants from rich
countries. South American women, excluding
women from Argentina, Chile and Uruguay,
have an average of 2.6 children each. Women
in North Africa and the Middle East have an
average of 2.8 children. Similarly, sub-Saharan
African women have an average of 2.9 children
each. (Martínez et al., pp. 114–15) These young,
growing populations contrast with the increas-
ing number of Spanish women who give their
professional lives priority over having children.
Some European governments have used incen-
tives to increase birth rates, although policies
that encourage childbirth tend to make
Europeans uneasy. (“Europe’s Population
Implosion”) In Sweden, tax benefits for work-
ing mothers initially raised the birth rate. In
France, funding for childcare programs, high-
er than in any other EU country, has given
France the highest birth rate in the EU. These
are examples of initiatives European govern-
ments have used to raise their birth rates, show-
ing what a concern population decline is across
Europe. Birth rates among immigrants can
change, and often do, as immigrant women are
influenced by and adapt to Spanish culture. For
instance, immigrant women from sub-Saharan
Africa who use birth control began using it
when they came to Spain. (Martínez et al., 
p. 114) The difference in birth rates underlies
the primary reason immigrants want to come
to Spain: to improve their standard of living.
Gaps in Standard of Living
Immigration flows are largely a result of
the gaps in income between Spain and the poor
countries that immigrants to Spain leave
behind. As income gaps widen, the pressure
from migrant flows will increase. Immigrants
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tend to be very mobile, adapting to changing
economic opportunities. (Ugalde, p. 101) They
respond to opportunities to increase their earn-
ings and raise their standard of living. On the
United Nations Development Programme’s
Human Development Index, Spain ranked 20th
globally in 2004. This measure of literacy, life
expectancy, and standard of living, which
ranked Spain just behind France and Germany,
ranked Morocco 125th. (“Human Development
Report 2004...”) Of the Latin American coun-
tries from which immigrants come, Colombia
ranked 73rd, Ecuador ranked 100th, and Bolivia
ranked 114th. These rankings show that Spain
offers immigrants a chance to enjoy a longer
life, a greater opportunity for literacy and learn-
ing, and a higher standard of living. 
Moroccans comprise the largest group of
non-Europeans living in Spain. The difference
between the standard of living in Spain and the
standard of living in Morocco is considerable.
Spain’s GDP per capita in 2002 was $21,460,
whereas Morocco’s was just $3,810. The differ-
ence in income is a compelling reason for many
Moroccans to seek employment in Spain, and
often they take dangerous risks to get there.
Two-thirds of those crossing the choppy Straits
of Gibraltar are Moroccans. The remaining
third are mainly sub-Saharan Africans. (“Over
the Sea to Spain”) The passage across the
Sahara through Morocco and Spain is the most
common route sub-Saharan Africans take to get
to Europe.
Argentines are the next largest group of
non-Europeans coming to Spain after
Moroccans. Twenty years ago, much more
migration occurred within Latin America.
(“Emigration from Latin America...”) Now Latin
Americans primarily go to the United States or
Europe. Of immigrants from Latin America,
many come from Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, and
the Dominican Republic. (Toribio, p. 51) In
many instances, Latin Americans leave their
countries because of limited economic oppor-
tunities at home. They sometimes have other
reasons for leaving, including violence, war, and
crime. While many Latin American emigrants
are poor, others are educated and middle class.
(“Emigration from Latin America...”) 
Spain’s Changing Economy
Over the past 30 years, Spain has experi-
enced both a declining birth rate and a shift
from being a country of emigrants to a country
of immigrants. Both of these changes have
shaped the character of Spain’s economy, in
addition to yet another change: a shift from
agriculture to a service-based economy. In the
1960s, Spain’s labor force started shifting away
from agriculture and into services, a trend that
continues today. In 1970, 38.7 percent of the
workforce were in the agricultural sector and
31 percent were employed in services. In 1990,
11.8 percent were employed in agriculture and
54.8 percent were in the service sector.
(Fuentes, p. 115) Spain’s shift was more dra-
matic than in other EU countries. Commenting
on this shift, The Economist says that Spanish
workers today “must now find higher-earning
and more productive jobs than the unskilled
ones of the past.” (“The Second Transition...”)
The shift Spanish workers made toward high-
er-income jobs has made more jobs available in
low-wage sectors, where immigrants often find
work. These low-wage jobs are typically in
domestic service, catering, agriculture, con-
struction, and retail. (“The Social Partners...”)
Agricultural work remains an important
source of employment for low-wage workers,
often immigrants. Spanish farmers face an eth-
ical dilemma when it comes to hiring, because
many of the workers available to work in the
hot climate of southern Spain come from sub-
Saharan Africa and the Magreb and are willing
to work for extremely low wages. Few Spaniards
are willing to work in the arid farmlands along
the southern coast. Without immigrants, the
demand for labor in this hot, arid region would
not be met. 
As the economy has moved toward a serv-
ice-based one in the last forty years, another
recent global change has also affected Spain:
international terrorism. Spaniards have not yet
formed any major anti-immigration move-
ments, but they are worried about terrorism.
In a 2000–2001 survey, 80 percent of Spaniards
said that defeating terrorism was their prima-
ry concern. Their next-highest concerns were
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to reduce unemployment and to reduce the
crime rate. (Martinez, 2004) Spain has exten-
sive experience in countering terrorism domes-
tically because of the long-standing challenge
posed by Basque extremists. Authorities apply
this experience in responding to international
terrorism. 
Because the movement of people across
borders is associated with national security, the
Spanish government has combined the offices
that oversee immigration and national securi-
ty to be more effective in providing security. In
addition, Spain applies its experience in deal-
ing with Basque terrorists. A major problem in
Spain is a hashish trafficking network, closely
linked with the financing of international ter-
rorism, that cuts through its borders. Spanish
police seized 70.4 percent of hashish being
smuggled into the EU in 2002. (“Police
Warns...”) As General Commissioner of Judicial
Police José García Losada has said, “We are
especially worried about the north of Africa.”
(“Police Warns...”) Because of this concern,
European policies toward North Africa since the
1990s have had a stronger security orientation.
(Closa and Heywood, p. 223) The unmonitored
movement of people crossing illegally into
Spain compounds the immigration issue, as the
merging of the immigration and national secu-
rity departments illustrates. Most Spaniards 
(85 percent) say that the government should
only admit workers that the labor market
“needs.” (Collado et al., p. 336) Because so many
Spaniards think foreigners should be allowed
to work in Spain when the labor market needs
them, it is important to assess the demand for
additional low-wage and low-skilled labor that
exists in Spain. This is done in the following
section. 
The Economic Impact of
Immigration 
Two things that make Spain’s economy
unique are its long history of high unemploy-
ment and its large grey economy. The grey
economy encompasses all economic transac-
tions that are not accounted for in official sta-
tistics, which in Spain could be over one-fifth
of GDP. Not all activity in the grey economy is
what we would typically think of as “illicit.”
Alternative ways of generating income include
artisan production, unregistered work on farms,
in homes, and in hotels, and work in hidden fac-
tories. (Bermeo, p. 270) These “alternative”
sources of income are closely connected with
formal income generation, as families support
each other through different sources of earned
income. (Bermeo, p. 270) The substantial
amount of unaccounted activity suggests that
the true unemployment rate may not be as high
as official data suggest. One-fifth of Spain’s GDP
amounts to roughly €160 billion. 
This high level of unregistered activity
explains how Spain has been able to absorb
more immigrants than official employment sta-
tistics (which continue to show high unem-
ployment) suggest has been possible. Finding
employment in this way, illegal immigrants
may have a more positive effect on native
Spanish wages than legal immigrants.
(Ehrenberg and Smith, p. 330) Whereas legal
immigrants often come to Spain to reunite with
family members, illegal immigrants are more
likely to come to find work. Spanish farm own-
ers are regularly approached by undocument-
ed workers willing to work for half the mini-
mum wage. (Martinez, 2004) When farmers
hire workers in the grey economy for below-
minimum wages, a gap in labor protection
emerges, leaving a class of protected workers
and a class of unprotected workers. This divi-
sion translates into unequal access to social
security and unequal job security. (Glatzer, 
p. 93) 
Official estimates suggest that 10.4 per-
cent of the Spanish workforce is unemployed
(in 2004). Juan José Toribio argues that this
high level of unemployment, which has been
persistent in Spain for decades, can be explained
by labor market rigidity. (Toribio, p. 55)
Government regulations of the labor market
include laws that make it difficult for employ-
ers to dismiss workers. Similar worker protec-
tions are common throughout Europe. In
Spain, laws that make it difficult to terminate
employment contracts with workers were
passed under Franco. When Spain democra-
tized, unions kept their no-dismissal privileges,
while at the same time negotiating high wages.
Unions engage in wage bargaining for close to
80 percent of the Spanish workforce. (Jimeno,
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p. 127) This high rate of collective bargaining
makes Spain’s labor market less competitive
than other European countries, particularly the
new EU member countries. The labor market
also is less competitive because Spanish work-
ers are not usually willing to relocate to anoth-
er part of the country for a new job. Together
these two factors weaken Spain’s competitive-
ness vis-a-vis acceding EU countries where
workers are more likely to relocate for jobs and
wages are lower.
Full-time, unionized workers are usually
paid more than they would be if their wages
were set by the market rather than by collec-
tive bargaining. All legal workers also enjoy a
40-hour work week and 4 weeks vacation.
(Glatzer, p. 106) Because of the job protection
full-time workers enjoy, employers are increas-
ingly likely to hire workers for temporary work,
without giving them the benefits associated
with full-time employment. (“The Second
Transition...,” p. 9) Approximately one-third of
workers in Spain have temporary contracts with
their employers. Many contracts are for less
than six months, making Spain the European
country with the most insecure working con-
ditions. (O’Flynn)
Immigration’s benefits are more immedi-
ate when wages and prices are more flexible,
which may explain immigration’s beneficial
effects in Spain where the grey economy com-
prises such a high level of economic activity.
(Wyplosz, p. 89) According to one study, the
labor market outcomes of unskilled native
Spanish workers were not significantly reduced
after a 1991 increase in the number of legal
immigrants in Spain. The study’s authors,
Dolado, Duce, and Jimeno-Serrano, found that
“the elasticity of wages with respect to the
immigration rate is small but positive, and the
elasticity of employment of unskilled workers
is negative but not significant.” (Dolado et al.,
p. 18) Spain also benefits from legal immigrant
labor through contributions immigrants make
to the Seguridad Social, which supports aging
Spaniards. European countries worry that they
will wind up paying more welfare benefits to
immigrants than immigrant workers con-
tribute. In Spain, all immigrants, including
those in Spain illegally, have a legal right to
basic health care and a right to education until
age 18. (Toribio) However, other studies predict
that immigrants will contribute more to the
economy than they will take out. (“Migration
in the European Union...”) Taxes in Spain are
both direct (paid as a percentage of personal
income) and indirect (as a value-added tax on
purchases). Because of indirect taxes, even ille-
gal migrants contribute to the government
when they spend. Studies show that, in gener-
al, immigrants are overall net contributors to
the economy, as taxpayers and as workers pay-
ing into social security. Immigrants’ contribu-
tions overall are especially important in Spain,
where an aging population makes their contri-
bution to taxes and social security crucial.
In addition to contributing to social secu-
rity, immigrants tend to be mobile and seek
work in places in Spain where natives are gen-
erally unwilling to relocate. Along the southern
coast of Spain, the agricultural work is exceed-
ingly hard. Africans who come from hot cli-
mates are often better able to do this difficult
work and tolerate the heat. (Martinez, 2004) As
such, immigrants complement, rather than
substitute for, Spanish workers in the labor
market. In addition to agricultural work, low-
skilled labor is needed in other industries as
well. Construction, for instance, is a sector that
employs many foreign workers. 
It should be pointed out that the various
regions in Spain are affected differently by
immigration. Generally, those regions with the
highest unemployment levels are the regions
with the largest grey economies. (Bermeo, 
p. 270) Northern regions of Spain receive far
fewer immigrants than southern and peripher-
al regions. Madrid has the highest proportion
of immigrants with 200,000 immigrants in a
population of three million. Catalonia receives
the most immigrants of any region with its
250,000 immigrants in a population of six mil-
lion. Andalucia, the Canary Islands, the Balearic
Islands, Ceuta and Melilla also have high pro-
portions of immigrants. (Toribio, p. 52) 
How did immigrants come to fill this inte-
gral role in the Spanish economy? And how
have such high numbers of immigrants entered
Spain illegally? The following section describes
immigration to Spain over the last 20 years.
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Spanish Immigration Law
Spain’s initial immigration policies were
created when the government realized that, for
the first time since Franco’s regime, more peo-
ple were coming into Spain than leaving it.
Spaniards had long been emigrating for 
higher-earning jobs elsewhere. But in the late
1970s, many Spaniards who had emigrated
began returning to Spain as the economy
improved. Spain also became a place to which
non-Spanish immigrants desired to come. At
about the same time, Spain was preparing to
enter the European Community and needed
laws that met European standards, including
laws to regulate immigration. After the first
Spanish immigration law was passed in 1986,
Spain joined the European Community. Spain’s
immigration policy at the time was reactive,
like the immigration policies of the other
Southern European countries — Portugal,
Italy, and Greece — in trying to control the
entry of immigrants and stop illegal entry. 
When Spain began legislating on immi-
gration in 1985, it considered immigration a
temporary phenomenon and gave legal status
to those immigrants already living in Spain. Yet
immigration continued at a steady pace, and in
addition many immigrants entering Spain did
not enter legally. In 1991, the Spanish govern-
ment gave these illegal immigrants legal sta-
tus. In 1996, the government amended its
immigration law, known in Spain as the Ley de
Extranjería. The amendment recognized immi-
gration as more than a short-term phenome-
non and further increased the rights given to
immigrants. Four years after the immigration
law was amended, the government passed yet
another law, Law 4/2000, which was amended
as Law 8/2000 less than one year later, to
improve the social integration of immigrants
into Spanish society. In trying to increase its
control over immigration flows, this legislation
gave sharply different rights to legal and illegal
migrants. (Closa and Heywood, p. 236) For
example, illegal immigrants do not have the
right to join unions or strike. Then in 2001, a
still more global, coordinated immigration pol-
icy was created. Implemented over the period
2001–2004, the Plan GRECO gave regional gov-
ernments a central role in integrating immi-
grants into Spanish society.
Even more recent changes to immigration
law in 2005 increased the responsibility of
employers to hire only legal workers. This leg-
islation made employers responsible for filing
the national health insurance paperwork for
immigrant workers. Employers can also now be
fined up to €60,000 for hiring illegal immi-
grants. The 2005 legislation has two additional
aims. The first is to reduce exploitative labor
practices; the second is to increase tax and
national insurance revenue. (Crawford) To qual-
ify for residence and work permits under the
new law, immigrants need to have a job con-
tract and be able to prove that they have lived
in Spain for more than six months. The
Financial Times expects that the legislation will
benefit 800,000 to 1 million immigrants living
in Spain illegally, calling this the “largest ever
amnesty for illegal immigrants in Europe.”
(Crawford)
Since 2002 the Spanish government has
set annual quotas for foreign labor. These quo-
tas are set after consulting with businesses and
local leaders throughout Spain to determine
the need for additional workers in each sector.
In setting each year’s quota, regional govern-
ments make recommendations with the advice
of trade unions and employee associations.
(Toribio, p. 50) To fill the annual labor quota,
the government gives work permits directly to
workers still in their country of origin to dis-
courage people from coming to Spain illegally
before they have a work permit. 
Spain also periodically grants legal status
and residence permits to all illegal immigrants
already in the country. This periodic granting
of legal status, known as “regularization,” dra-
matically demonstrates the scale of unmoni-
tored immigration into Spain. With the regu-
larization that occurred in 1991, the number of
legal foreign workers went from 50,168 to
124,554, an increase of about 125 percent. It is
likely that there were many more foreigners in
Spain who did not take advantage of the oppor-
tunity. (Huntoon, pp. 434–35) The high num-
bers of illegal immigrants who appear in offi-
cial statistics when given the opportunity to
legalize their status demonstrate what one ana-
lyst calls Southern Europe’s “partial and inef-
fective” attempt to control migration.
(Freeman, p. 895)
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Immigration to Spain accounted for one-
third of all immigration to Europe in 2004.
(Crawford). For this reason, European immi-
gration ministers have urged Spain to coordi-
nate its immigration policies with the EU.
German Interior Minister Otto Schily recently
expressed concern that immigrants will be able
to move freely to France and Germany. As a sig-
natory to the Schengen Agreement, which
allows people to move freely throughout most
of Europe, Spain’s policies have implications for
all other signatories (most of the EU). In set-
ting immigration policy, Spain must consider
the concerns of EU member countries, along
with the effects that its policies have on the
countries from which immigrants come. The
following section considers the effects that
Spanish immigration policy has on poor coun-
tries.
What Happens to the Countries
Immigrants Leave Behind?
Poor countries lose financial capital and
human capital when people emigrate. The best
educated and most enterprising are the most
likely to leave poor countries. (“The View from
Afar...”) Yet clearly poor countries also stand to
gain through emigration. Emigration lessens
tensions in a crowded labor market. It also gives
the relatives of emigrants added income when
emigrants send their earnings back to family
members. These remittance payments support
the home economy. Globally, developing coun-
tries receive an estimated $60 billion a year 
in remittance payments (“The View from
Afar...”) with Latin America and the Caribbean
receiving an estimated $15 billion a year.
(“Emigration from Latin America...”)
“Remittances,” writes The Economist, “have
become a far more important source of revenue
than foreign aid.” (“Emigration from Latin
America...”) A study by Susan Martin of
Georgetown University also shows that each
dollar sent back to the home country generates
several additional dollars in economic growth.
(Martin) 
Immigration policy can thus do much to
aid or harm developing countries; still it is only
one way that the policies of rich countries can
affect poor countries. In fact, trade policy can
be more detrimental to developing countries
than immigration policy. For instance, the
European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) has substantial effects on income levels
in North Africa, which in turn affect migration
patterns. The CAP subsidizes farming in Spain
and leaves African farmers unable to compete
with the low prices of Spanish agricultural
products and cotton. Reducing the subsidies for
domestic farming would make Spain more like-
ly to import crops from Morocco, instead of the
current practice of growing expensively irri-
gated crops in Spain with Moroccan labor. (“The
Second Transition...”) Such a policy change
would have a greater effect on migration move-
ment than a change in immigration policy.
These agricultural protections are part of
the reason why Spain ranked poorly in a mea-
sure of rich countries’ aid to poor countries, the
Commitment to Development Index of the
Center for Global Development and the
Financial Times. Spain may rank low because
it has high barriers to trade, despite having a
relatively open immigration policy. Reduced
trade barriers would lessen the flow of immi-
gration to Spain, if migration results from dif-
ferences in income. Wyplosz puts it succinctly
when he says, “Trade and migration are substi-
tutable ways of achieving the same result.”
(Wyplosz, p. 81) In other words, the difference
in standards of living is a driving force behind
why so many immigrants come to Spain, and
stopping immigrants from crossing the Straits
of Gibraltar may not address the reason behind
the migrant flow. The Economist also claims
that the immigration issue is rooted in a dif-
ference in earning potential and standard of liv-
ing: “The flow of migrants will not cease until
Morocco’s living standards approach Spain’s.”
(“The Second Transition...”). To address the dif-
ference in the standards of living of Spain and
poor countries in Africa and Latin America,
Spanish policymakers should therefore consid-
er the effects their policies have on immigra-
tion levels. 
Spain should also work in partnership
with sending countries, Morocco in particular,
to develop a more comprehensive, cooperative
immigration policy. Spain might encourage
Moroccan authorities to cooperate more close-
ly to reduce the number of migrants crossing
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the Straits of Gibraltar by increasing aid to
Morocco and by reducing Spanish subsidies for
domestic farming. By directing aid toward the
poorest regions abroad and by addressing the
disadvantages that CAP subsidies place on the
agricultural viability of poor countries, Spain
can gradually reduce the rate at which immi-
grants seek to come to Spain. 
Conclusion
Immigrants have become an integral part
of Spain’s economy. As the country’s population
ages, immigrants will play an increasingly
important part in supporting a viable Seguridad
Social. Recognizing the important role that
immigrants have in sustaining Spain’s aging
population, Spanish policymakers have been
focusing their attention on how to make immi-
gration safe and legal. The substantial activity
in Spain’s grey economy has shown that immi-
grants are finding work in Spain despite the
persistently high official unemployment rate.
By making the immigration process more open
and legal and by promoting economic growth
in the regions from which immigrants come,
Spain can be more successful at integrating
immigrants into a strong, new Spain.
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